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In. the Supreme Court 
of the· State of Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
.. 
I 
vs. Civil No. 7870 
PAUL McFARLAND and MRS. PAUL 
:NlcF ARLAND, 
Defendants and Appellants. · 
Brief of Defendants and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by Salt Lake City against the 
defendants named to recover for water allegedly furnished 
by plaintiff to defendants. Plaintiff's theory is announced in 
the following paragraph of the complaint: 
n ?.·. That on or about January 3, 1950, the defendants 
and each of them became indebted to plaintiff for water 
furnished by said plaintiff to said defendants at their 
special instance and request in the agreed sum of One 
Hundred Eighty-four and 31/100 ($184.31) Dollars 
(R. 1). 
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The right to the use of the waters of Big Cottonwood 
Creek was originally determined in the decree referred to 
as the ''Morse Decree," dated April 13, 1944. (The .Progress 
Company, a corporation, vs. Salt Lake City, a municipal cor-
poration, and numerous other persons and parties; District 
Court of Salt Lake County Decree No. 8921) (R. 118-131). 
The owners of the rights of the irrigation ditch known as the 
"Green Ditch" were confirmed and defined in that decree. 
On or about March 22, 1915, the owners of those rights 
incorporated under the name ((Green Ditch Water Company." 
The Articles of Incorporation of this corporation are intro-
duced in evidence in this action as 'CE:xhibit 2." The powers 
of the corporation, insofar as they are pertinent to this action, 
are as follows: 
Ctto own, hold, maintain, operate, encumber, contract 
to sell, sell and convey reservoirs, and to acquire by 
appropriation, purchase or otherwise, and to own, 
lease, sell, exchange, distribute and dispose of all water 
and water rights for every purpose whatsoever; to 
acquire title to the Green Ditch situate in Sections 8, 
9, 10, 14, 15 and 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian, Salt Lake County, Utah, together 
with the easements and servitudes and the property_ 
rights incident thereto; to acquire the title to the wat~r 
rights of all w_aters of Big Cottonwood ~re~k dts-
tributed through said Green Ditch; to ma1nta1n and 
keep in repair said Green Ditch and all of the str~c­
tures used in connection therewith; to control the dts-
tribution between the stockholders of this corporation 
and owners of the waters of said· Big Cottonwood 
Creek which would properly be distributed through 
the Green Ditch; to fix, charge and collect from its 
stockholders reasonable tolls, rentals, maintenance and 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
service charges in such n1anner as may be determined 
upon by regulation or byla,vs adopted for that purpose, 
or by means of assessn1ents levied upon its capital 
stock in acordance \vith the laws of the State of Utah, 
and to fix such remedy or penalty as its board of direc-
tors may decide upon for the non-payment of such 
charges so fixed or assessed against its stockholders." 
The Articles further provide in Article VIII: 
((Each share of stock of this corporation shall ~ep­
resent a water right equal to 1/2280 part of the water 
decreed to the Green Ditch in the suit pending in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah; in 
and for the County of Salt Lake, wherein The Progress 
Company is plaintiff and Salt Lake City and others are 
defendants, being Case No. 8921." 
Article XIV provides: 
((This corporation has acquired title to the Green 
Ditch situated in Sections 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 16, Town-
ship 2 South, Range 1 East of Salt Lake Meridian, and 
the waters- of Big Cottonwood Creek, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, which have heretofore been distributed to the 
owners thereof through the Green Ditch, which is 
of- a fair cash value- of Twenty-two I-Iundred Eighty_ 
Dollars, and it has accepted the same in payment in 
full for the stock subscribed by the incorporators of 
this company as above set forth." 
Article XV -pro~ ides: 
((No lands, interest in land, water or water rights· 
shall be purchased or sold for or on behalf of this 
corporatio_n by its board of directors except upon ap-
proval thereof by an affirmative vote of all of the 
capital stock of this corporation issued and outstanding 
at a meeting duly called to consider such question." 
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There is no provision in the Articles for their amendment. 
On or about December 15, 1920, an agreement was en-
tered into between Salt Lake City, a municipal corporation, 
plaintiff in this action, -and part of the stockholders of the 
Green Ditch Co~poration. A copy of the agreement is intro-
duced in this action as ((Exhibit H." It provides that the stock-
holders 
udo hereby transfer and convey to Sa~t Lake City all 
rights, title and interest in and to the perpetual use 
of the waters of Green Ditch to which each respectively 
is entitled; subject, however, to the reservations, terms 
and conditions · in this agreement set forth. 
uEach of the parties hereto reserves an ownership 
in and the right to the constant and perpetual use 
during the winter season of each year, to-wit: from 
October 1st to April 1st following, of water in said · 
Green. Ditch equivalent to and upon the basis of 
500 gallons per daly for each acre of land owned by 
any such party under the Green Ditch; and during 
the sun1mer months of each year, to-wit: from April 
1st to October 1st following, of water equivalent 
to and upon the basis of 900 gallons per day for 
each acre of land owned by any such party under the 
Green Ditch. The exact acreage owned by each of 
the parties hereto in whom said 500 gallons of water 
in the winter season and said 90 gallons of water in 
the summer season per acre, as above set forth, is 
reserved and title thereto retained is as follows: * * * " 
The agreement provided further that the said water so 
reserved ((to he distributed and delivered by Salt Lake City 
to said parties shall be distributed and delivered by Salt 
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Lake City free of all charge and expense to the respective 
owners through water mains to be laid and n1aintained by Salt 
Lake City, as hereinafter more specifically set forth." The 
agreement further provi~ed that Salt Lake City should furnish 
and ·deliver to the stockholders designated amounts of water 
suitable for irrigation purposes. 
The contract was explicit that the water delivered by Salt 
Lake City for other than irrigation purposes in the amounts 
specified should be based upon the acreage of the person who 
signed the agreement. (See for example Page 5 of Exhibit H). 
The agreement provided further: 
"If any such water owner uses water in excess of 
the quantity of water to which he is entitled, he shall 
pay f9r the same at the- regular Salt Lake ~ity water 
rate charges at_ the time of use. Any water owner, 
his successors and assigfl:s, shall have the right to use 
the waters of Salt Lake City through said pipe line in 
excess of the quantity of water so owned and reserved 
by him upon the payment by him to Salt Lake City 
_of the regular Salt Lake City water rate charges at 
the time of use, subject, however, to the same rules 
and regulations as apply to the residents of Salt Lake I 
City at the time of use." (Exhibit H, Page 6). 
It appears at Entry No. 8 of Exhibit G, an abstract of 
title to the property owned by the defendant Paul McFarland 
in this action, that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants 
signed this agreement with ·Salt Lake City. 
Exhibit 2, the Articles of Incorporation of Green Ditch 
Water Company, indicates that there is only one class of 
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. stock of ·.this: corporation, . and that the corporation:· has no 
basis for the recognition of stockholders by class, . type of water 
used, or upon any other basis. 
The record shows that the defendants to this action, 
Archie Paul McFarland and Lorna Ruth McFarland, his wife, 
received a deed as joint tenants to approximately three acres 
of land on June 26, 1945 (Exhibit G, P. 43), and that in-
cluded with said land were nthree . shares of Green Ditch 
irrigation water stock and one share of Green . Ditch culinary 
water stock.'' Plaintiff's counsel stated that defendants owned 
2.88 acres of land (A. 100). The ~ecord shows further that 
in addition to the four shares of stock therein mentioned 
defendants are the owners of one additional share of stock 
in the corporation (R. 50). The stock shown on the certificates 
obtained with the deed to the land has not been transferred 
to the names of defendants because of the stand taken by the 
board of directors that there were not several classes of stock 
or two classes having culinary and irrigation rights, but only 
one class under the corporation Articles (R. 88, 89, 90, 91). 
In other words, Mr. and Mrs. McFarland were the owners 
of a stock certificate obtained from a Mr. Pace for four 
quarter-acre shares (R. 50 and 60), and in addition were 
the owners of a certificate representing shares which were 
listed on the books of the corporation as belonging to one Mr. 
Jacklin. Defendants, however, paid assessments since the 
time of acquisition, and the possession of this stock in defend-
ants was recognized by the corporation (R. 90-91). 
·Mr. Berrett of the City Water Department testified that 
his calculation of the amount ·due in this action by the de-
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fendant "'as based upon the assumption that the defendants 
owned only one share of stock. If they were the owners of two 
or three or four shares of stock, then there would be no in-
debtedness due· to Salt Lake City (R. 3 7, 38). This calculation 
is based solely upon the ownership of a single share of stock. 
If defendants \vere entitled to use water based on the owner-
ship of two, three or four acres of land, rather than one share 
of stock, they would likewise owe nothing to Salt Lake City 
for the use of water, the amount of which is not in dispute 
in this action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUD-
ING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE. UPON THE 
THEORY THAT THEY· HAVE A CREDIT OF 900 GAL-
LONS PER DAY PER SHARE OF CULINARY STOCK. 
(a) The 1920 contract provides that the contracting parties 
should be entitled to a credit of 900 gallons per day per acre 
of land. 
(b) The Court erred in arbitrarily anzending the Articles 
of Incorporation to recognize more than one class of stock. 
POINT NO~ II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AND 
CONCLUDE THAT THE WATER RIGHTS ADJUDI-
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CATEDIN THE· SO:.CALLED ttMORS~ DECREE'' ARE 
OWNED BY THE GREEN DITCH WATER COMPANY. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THERE IS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN SALT 
LAKE CITY AND THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION, 
AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO 
SALT LAKE CITY ON A CONTRACT THEORY. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING GALLONAGE 
CREDIT ON A MONTHLY BASIS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUD-
ING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE UPON rHE 
THEORY THAT THEY HAVE A CREDIT ·oF 900 GAL-
LONS PER DAY PER SHARE OF CULINARY STOCK. 
(a) The 1920 contract provides that the contracting parties 
. should be entitled to a credit of 900 gallons per day per acn 
of land .. 
The Court found in Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact 
that on or about December 15, 1920, stockholders of said 
. 10 
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company (Green Ditch Water Company), including the stock-
holder predecessors-in-interest of defendant Paul McFarland 
entered into an agreement with plaintiff, Salt Lake City, 
by the terms of '"hich said stockholders transferred to 
Salt Lake City their rights to the use of Big Cottonwood 
to Salt Lake City their rights to the use of Big Cottonwood 
Creek water to ":-hich they were entitled, reserving, however, 
the right to use water for culinary purposes as follows: A 
constant and perpetual flow of 500 gallons of water per day 
for each acre of land in and under the Green Ditch from 
October 1st to April 1st of each year, and 900 gallons of 
water per day for each acre of land in and under the Green 
Ditch from April 1st to October 1st of each year. 
It is true that this is a correct summary of the agreement 
introduced as ttE:xhibilt H" insofar as the contracting parties 
are concerned. Salt Lake City obtained from those persons 
under that agreement the right to certain use of the water and 
the persons to the agreement reserved the amount indicated. 
Even if it is admitted for the purpose of argument that 
the stock owned by the defendants in some mysterious way 
became committed by the agreement of the owner of the 
stock, notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence to 
the effect that the defendants h-ad any notice of any such 
agreement, the Court in this case nevertheless misconstrued 
the contract in this action. It based the liability of the de-
fendants upon the number of shares they owned and assumed 
that they owned only one share. The fact of the matter is 
that the land, the only pertinent consideration under the con-
tract, which is owned by the defendants, is described as follows: 
11 
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,:- 1 ',.;~ .. . . nBeginning at a point 789.36 feet North and 392.7 
East and North 3 ° East 544.48 feet £rom the- South-
west corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 9, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meriidan, and running thence North 3 ° East 260.72 
feet, more or less to the center line of Big Cottonwood 
Creek; thence following the center line of said creek 
South 75 ° 30' East 3.30 chains; thence North 74° 45' 
East along the creek bed 6.60 chains to the north end 
of Big Cottonwood Bridge; thence South 31° West 
along the center of County Road 2.41 chains; thence 
South 6° West 123.01 feet to a point North 86° 07' 
East 549.59 feet from the point of beginning; thence 
South 86° 07' West 549.59 feet to the place of begin-
ning* * *." 
Exhibit G, Entry 43. The other entries in the abstract 
are conclusive that this is the property owned by the de-
fendants in this action. The amount of acreage in their piece 
of land can be mathematically computed and is therefore sub-
ject to judicial notice from this evidence. Plaintiff's counsel 
at the trial admitted that defendants owned 2.88 acres. It is 
referred to generally in this brief as 3 acres. 
It thus appears that even if the Court was correct in its 
conclu~ion and finding that the defendants are bound by the 
contract between certain stockholders of record of 1920 and 
Salt Lake City, it is nev.ertheless clear that the application 
of that contract does not result in any liability on the part 
·of these defendants. They own three acres of land. The con-
. tract between the stockholders and Salt Lake City sets forth 
a~ a criteria of liability and as a determination of the amount 
of reserved water the amount of land owned by the persons 
under the contract. Defendants are entitled to a credit of 500 
12 
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gallons of "rater per day during the winter months and 900 
gallons during the summer months per acre of land owned. 
The calculations of Mr. Berrett, of the City Water Depart-
ment, are based upon the assumption that the· defendants 
own only one share of 'll'ater. Defendants owned not only 
one, but five shares of stock in the Green Ditch Company. 
They owned three acres of land. The calculations of Mr. Ber-
rett and those of the Court are clearly inapplicable (R. 3 7-38). 
The Court did not have the power to re-write the 1920 
contract even if it was so inclined. The language of the con-
tract is not ambiguous. Evev. if it is, there is ?O evidence in 
support of any interpretation similar to that of the trial court. 
It is therefore submitted that the Court clearly erred in 
holding defendants liable under the contract ~on the theor~ 
that they have a credit of 500 gallons in the winter and 90.0 
gallons per day per share of stock. Failure to make a finding 
based upon their ownership of acreage, as the contract speci-
fies, constitutes reversible error. 
(b) The Court erred in arbitrarily amending the Artic,leJ 
of Incorporation to recognize more than one class of stock. 
The Court found in Paragraph 4 of the Findings of 
Fact: 
((That since entering into said agreement the stock-
holders of said company divided the water-rights they 
had heretofore owned into tvvo classes, irrigation rights 
still distributed by. the Green Ditch Water Company, 
and the quantity of \Vater reserved by the owners for 
culinary purposes in the quantities above specified. 
That the total number of acre shares of said Co1npany 
entitled to use said culinary water is 572." 
1? 
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The Court further found and stated in its memorandum 
decision that the real nub of the dispute (tseems to grow 
out of the fact that, after the exchange agreement was made, 
the waters of the stockholders in the Green· Ditch came to 
be known as irrigation water rights and as culinary water 
rights. * * * " 
The Court stated that the defendants contended that they 
were entitled to draw the gallonage applicable under the agree-
ment for each of their four shares, («contending that the Green 
Ditch Company only recognizes one kind of stock, and does 
not recognize a difference between culinary and irrigation 
rights. When the exchange agreement was made between 
the City (plaintiff) and Green ditch people, it was made 
by the City on the one hand and by the individual water 
users on the other. The Green ·Ditch Water; Company was 
merely a trustee as distributing agent for water users under 
the Green Ditch, the real title to the water being in individual 
users. * * * Such reserved water right was transferable by 
the owners thereof. The stockholders of the Green Ditch 
thus by their own act, lawfully divided the water rights they 
had theretofore O"\vned into two classes: irrigation rights 
still to be distributed by the trustee, Green Ditch Company; 
and the quantity of water reserved by the owners for culinary 
purposes became the culinary right on the 500 and 900 gallon 
basis per acre right owned or transferred by the owner." 
· The Court then undertook to further amend the Articles 
of Incorporation for the. stockholders in defiance of all of 
the rules of corporate law and held that the defendants were 
the owners of three shares of irrigation water rights and one 
share of culinary water. 
14 
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It is submitted that not only \vas the trial court in error 
in taking upon itself the prerogative of amending the cor-
porate Articles, but also that the stockholders themselves 
who "·ere parties to the agreement with Salt Lake City could 
not have amended the Articles and did not purport to amend 
them in this respect. 
Article V of the Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit 2, 
Page 2) provides: 
((The amount of the capital stock of this corporation 
shal be twenty-two hundred eighty dollars, divided 
into twenty-two eighty shares of the par value of one 
dollar each.'' 
Article VII (Exhibit 2, Page 3) provides in part: 
(tEach share of stock of this corporation shall repre-
sent a water right equal to 1/2280 part of the water 
decreed to the Green Ditch in the suit pending in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in 
and for the County of Salt Lake, wherein the Progress 
Company is plaintiff and Salt Lake City, et al. are 
defendants, being Case No. 8921.", 
The Articles provided, as elsewhere stated in this brief, 
that the water rights and the land owned by the organizers 
of the corporation were taken by the corporation in consider-
ation for the issuance of its stock. 
Article XV provided (Exhibit 2, Page 6) : 
~~No lands, interest in lands, water or water rights 
shall be purchased or sold for or on behalf of this 
corporation by its board of directors, except upon ap-
proval thereof by an affirmative vote of all of the capital 
stock of this corporation issued and outstanding at a 
meeting duly called to consider such question." 
15 
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The finding of the trial court that the stockholders had 
amended the Articles of Incorporation by dealing with certain 
rights as irrigation rights and certain others as culinary rights 
or culinary stock cannot be supported in law and is not sup-
ported by the evidence in this action. Certainly the district 
court cannot arbitrarily amend the Articles of Incorporation 
and conclude in effect that there are two different classes of 
stock when there has been no compliance or even attempted 
compliance with the statutes of this state concerning such 
amendments. 
Section 18-2-44 UCA, 1943, as amended, provides that 
articles of incorporation may be amended by a vote repre-
senting at least, 
cca majority in amount of the outstanding stock thereof 
entitled to vote at a stqckholders' meeting called for 
that purpose as prescribed in Section 18-2-45; provided, 
that, if all the stockholders entitled to vote vote in 
favor of such amendment at any meeting of the stock-
holders, the notice required by Section 18-2-45 need 
not be given; and provided further, that the original 
purpose of the corporation shall not be altered or 
changed without the approval and consent of all the 
outstanding stock, but the adding to the purposes . or 
object or extending the power and business of the cor-
poration shall not be deemed a change of the original 
purpose of the corporation * * * ." 
This requirement has .been a part of the Utah law since 
1880. See Keetch vs.-Cordner, 90 Utah 423, 427; 62 Pac. (2d) 
273; 108 A.L.R~ 52. 
Does the amendment apparently. made by Judge Larson 
in this action to the Articles of Incorporation relate to (tthe 
16 
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p~iginal purpose of_ the_ corporation? . We d? no~ know be-
cause -the amendment is not clearly defined. Presumably, 
it has something to do with the agreement between a portion 
of the stockholders and Salt Lake City. All the stockholders 
were not parties to the agreement. Therefore, they did not 
assent to the amendment. It appears clearly, therefore, that 
the amendment could not have been in conformity with the 
Utah law if it was related to the noriginal purpose of the 
corporation," and it must have been related to the original 
purpose because it apparently had something to do with the 
ownership and/ or control and/ or distribution of the water, 
for the handling of which the corporation was organized. 
Nor can it be argued successfully in this case that the 
decision of the trial court did not amount to an amendment . 
of the Articles. Judge Larson does not explicitly state in his 
memorandum decision or findings that the Articles were 
amended to recognize two classes of stock, but he does state 
in the face of the record which is that the defendants owned 
five shares of stock, that the plaintiff should recover because 
defendants own only one share. The only way by which this 
result can be obtained is by asserting and sustaining the 
proposition that the ownership of the stock which was called 
((irrigation stock" in the deed of conveyance was something 
different than stock in the Green Ditch Water Company con-
cerned with the agreement with Salt Lake City. In other 
words, if the plaintiff is to recover in this action by the a p-
plication of the 1920 contract, and if the ownership of stock 
is to be the criteria for the amount of credit received by de-
fendants, then the plaintiff must establish how much stock 
17 
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defendants own in order to apply the formula set out in the 
contract. 
The only evidence in this case is that the defendants 
owned five shares o~ stock. The one share of so-called ccculinary 
stock" was presented to plaintiff at the time the application 
for water was signed by Mrs. McFarland, but the deed of 
conveyance to defendants included one additional share of 
culinary stock and three shares of irrigation stock. It there-
fore appears that the Court was in the dilemma either of rec-
ognizing the validity of the five shares of stock as had been 
recognized by the corporation (the evidence of this_ recog-
nition is that defendants paid the assessment on all five shares; 
R. 89; see also R. 86 to the effect that the records of the 
corporation had been noted to show defen.dants' own-
ership of the shares); and seeR. 99 to the effect that the water 
master distributed water based on the recognition of defendant's 
ownership of 4Yz shares, or the Court had to find that the so-
called ((irrigation stock" was invalid in some way or did 
not come within the meaning of the Salt Lake City contract. 
Apparently the Court chose ·to take the latter course, but in 
so doing it in effect amended the Articles of Incorporation 
in derogation· of the rights -of the stockholders and in the 
face of the Utah statute. 
POINT NO. II · 
TI-IE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AND 
CONCLUDE THAT THE WATER RIGHTS ADJUDI-
CATEDIN THE SO-CALLED ((MORSE DECREE" ARE 
OWNED BY THE GREEN DITCH WATER COMPANY. 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plaintiff in this action bottomed its .complaint on 
the premise that Hon or about January 3, 1950, the defendants 
and each of them became indebted to plaintiff for water 
furnished by said plaintiff to said defendants at their special 
instance and request," in the amount claimed. The plaintiff 
thereby undertook to sue upon the theory of goods sold and 
delivered. Jt is hornbook law that part of plaintiff's burden 
was to prove that the title to the later allegedly delivered was 
in the plaintiff and that it had the right to deliver the same. 
Defendants' motion to make more certain the complaint 
by- setting forth more explicitly the terms of any implied or 
other contract was denied (R. 3). Defendant Paul McFarland 
then answered that: 
({The Green Ditch Water Company has had decreed 
to it, and is the owner of, the right to the use of a 
portion of the flow of the water of the Big Cottonwood 
Creek in Salt Lake County, Utah; that ·:said right is 
represented in the decree of the Third Judicial District 
Cou~t of the State of Utah, dated April 13, 1914, and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
in Case No. 8921; that the said Green Ditch Water 
Company has been at all times mentioned in the com-
plaint, and is at the present time the owner of the 
right to use all of the water so allocated to it by said 
decree. * * * 
. HThat all the waters which the defendant has re-
ceived and ~sed on his premises in Salt Lake County 
have been taken and used by defendant as a stock-
holder and are waters to which he. is entitled as a 
stockholder of the Green Ditch Water Company, and 
the defendant alleges that he has not at any time 
used water in excess of the amount to which he is 
entitled from said company." (R. 7, 8). 
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In his third defense, defendant Paul McFarland sets 
out again that Salt Lake City has distributed through a certain 
pipe line various waters to certain stockholders of the Green 
Ditch Water Company, and thatt here is no contract in effect· 
between Green Ditch Water Company and Salt Lake City. 
Defendant alleges that he is the owner of stock in the cor-
poration and is entitled to a proportion of the water. owned 
by the Green Ditch and that he is accountable only to Green 
Ditch Water Company for any water received through its 
system. 
One of the basic issues in this case, therefore, was ·whether 
the plaintiff could recover from these defendants for water 
which it did not own but which was owned by the Green 
Ditch Water Company and to the use of whicp the defendants 
had an undivicled share. 
The Court's attention is particularly invited to the fact 
that the defendant does not claim under this particular point 
that plaintiff could not theoretically recover on a cause of 
action of a different type than is here alleged. As to whether 
or not it could is entirely beside the point. In order to recover 
on the cause of action stated it must prove title to the goods 
allegedly sold and delivered. Defendants set up specially 
that plaintiff did not have title to the water and could not there-
fore recover on this theory. 
It is noted that in Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 of the 
Findings of Fact (R. 108, 109) the Court stated that (!the 
beenficial ownership of the right to use said water was vested 
in the stockholders of said company, sair company being the 
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distributive agent of the said water to its stockholders.·· And 
further: 
' 
nThat on or about December 15, 1920, stockholders 
of said company, including the stockholder predecessors 
in interest of defendant McFarland, entered into an 
agreement \Yith plaintiff Salt Lake City, by the terms 
of \Yhich said stockholders transferred to Salt Lake 
City their rights to the use of Big Cottonwood Creek 
to which they were entitled * * * ." 
There was, however, absolutely no evidence on the latter 
point, particularly with respect to the one share of water 
received by defendants from Mr. Pace (R. 60). The record 
does not show whether the predecessor-in-interest of this 
stock was a party to the 1920 Agreement. It will be noted 
(Exhibit H) that a large number of stockholders of the Green 
Ditch Water Company did not enter into a contract with 
Salt Lake City. The agreement referred to by the Court would, 
of course, not be binding upon any of these stockh9lders. Inso-
far as the Court holds to the contrary, the Finding and Con .. 
elusion are absolutely unsupported by the evidence in this case. 
Equally basic was the Court's error in finding that the 
title to the water was in the stockholders at the time of their 
agreement with Salt Lake City. 
This case is unlike East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah, 
149; 128 Pac. (2d) 277 (1942), where the object of the cor-
poration was to ((control, manage and distribute" ·the water. 
The language ((control, manage and distribute" does ·not 
operate to sever the water from the land. It is submitted that 
the Boyce case and the other cases which hold that language 
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of this type is inoperative to. vest. water-rights in the water 
company are not in point. The object of the corporation here 
was, among other things, Hto acquire the title to the water-
rights of all waters of Big Cottonv1ood Creek distributed 
through said Green Ditch" (Exhibit 2) . Article XV of 
Exhibit 2 is explicit: 
((No lands, interest in land, water or water-rights, 
shall be purchased or sold for or on behalf of this 
corporation by ·its board of directors except upon ap-
proval thereof by an affirmative vote of all of the 
capital stock of this corporation issued and outstand-
ing at a meeting duly called to consider such question." 
Article VII of the Articles specifies: 
((.Each share of stock of this corporation shall repre-
sent a water-right equal to 1/2280 part of the water 
decreed to the Green Ditch in the suit pending· in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, 
in and for the County of Salt Lake, wherein the Pro-
gress Company is plaintiff, and Salt Lake City and others 
are defendants, being case No. 8921." 
Article XIV provides that the corporation ·has acquired 
·title to the Green Ditch and states that the Green Ditch has 
been conveyed to . the corporation, and that the fair cash value 
has been accepted as payment in full for the stock· subscribed 
by the incorporators. See also R. 97. 
The powers and purposes of an irrigation company must, 
of course, be determined from its Articles of Incorporation. 
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Company v. Utah and 
Salt Lake Canal Co., 16 Utah 246, 52 Pac. 16S. ( 1898). 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The argument made under Point I that the Court was 
"~ithout authority to amend the corporate articles is equally 
applicable to the Court's finding 'vith respect to the ownership 
.of the "'rater. That ownership \Yas vested in the corporation and 
the stockholders had neither the right nor the power to divest 
it without a compliance Vtyith the Utah statute relating to 
amendments of articles of incorporation. 
Attention is invited to the fact that the error of the Court 
in this respect Vtras not inconsequential. Since the title was 
in the corporation and only a bare right to the use of the 
water in the stockholder, the 1920 Contract would be applicable 
only as an agreement between Salt Lake City and the parties· 
to the contract. Certainly if the contract was held to ((run 
with the land," then- the defendants in this action are entitled 
wtihout question to obtain the benefits of the contract, based 
upon the amount of acreage they own. If the contract does not 
((run with the land," then the argument made under Point 
III of this brief that it is not binding upon defendants be-
cause there is no privity between defendants and Salt Lake 
City is applicable. It is therefore necessary to determine in 
this action the owner of the water. 
It is submitted that the analysis of the trial court to the 
effect that the title was in the stockholders in the case a bar 
is erroneous. This case should clearly be disinguished from the 
Boyce case, supra, inasmuch as under are Articles of Incor-
poration here the purpose of the corporation was to acquire 
title in the water rights, and since the articles have never 
been amended in this respect, the corporation still owns them. 
\ 
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POINT NO. III 
1"'HE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
Tl-IERE IS NO PRIVITY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN SALT 
LAKE CITY AND THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION, 
AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT. LIABLE TO 
SALT LAKE CITY ON A CONTRACT THEORY. 
As already noted in this brief, the plaintiff in this case 
sued upon the theory of general assumpsit. That is the only 
theory of liability stated in the complaint (R. 1, Par. 3). The 
plaintiff did not frame its complaint to sue upon a special 
contract theory at all. 
·During the course of the trial, however, plaintiff· did 
make a half-hearted effort to fasten liability upon defendant~ 
on the theory that there was a special contract and explicit 
agreement between Salt Laek City and these defendants. In 
an answer to a written interrogatory, Mr. E. R. Berrett, of-
fice manager of the Water Department of thy City, stated 
that there was a contract made between him, acting for the 
City, and Mrs. McFarland, at .the time she signed a regular 
application card for water (R. 5). 
On cross-examination, however, Mr. Berrett finally admit-
ted that he did not know of any contract between· Salt L~ke 
City and the McFa:rlands (R. 44). What he previously had 
explained in his testimony was a contract, he admitted on 
cross-examination to be nothing more than a . tradition or cus-
tom of Salt Lake City (R. 43-44). The . fact of the matter 
is that the custom or tradition apparently referred to by 
Mr. Berrett had its roots in the contract identified in this case 
24 
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as ttExhibit H" between Salt Lake City and various stock-
holders of the Green Ditch Water Company. Plaintiff's counsel 
admitted that it could not prove a chain of title in the stock from 
the stockholders who signed to defendants (R. 67). That con-
tract was made on or about December 15, 1950. The defendants 
in this action \Yere not parties to it. There never was and is not 
now a contract between defendants and Salt Lake City. Salt 
Lake City has promised these defendants nothing and they 
have promised nothing in return. Salt Lake City has made no 
offer to defendants and has proved no consideration to the 
McFarlands or any other persons in support of any alleged 
promise or performance to the McFarlands. 
Certainly it cannot be argued that the 1920 contract was 
an incident of the ownership of realty~ and that defendants 
are in privity with Salt Lake City on that theory, without 
admitting the validity of the argument made in Point I (a) 
of this brief. If the 1920 agreement be considered as a limita-
tion on the right to use the stock, then these defendants are 
not liable, for there is no evidence that they ever had any 
notice of such agreement at the time they obtained' the stock 
certificates. It cannot be said that they had constructive notice 
by reason of the filing of the contract in the County Recorder's 
office unless it is also admitted that the contract was an inci-
dent to_ the ownership of the real property, thus admitting the 
validity of the argument made in Poi~t. I (a) . 
The Court's attention is again invited to the fact that 
the only contract the Court can look to is the one in fact made 
in 1920. The contracting parties did not agree to the surrender 
of the stock certificates to Salt Lake City in such a way that 
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·the. City·: might haveJ protected itself against the possibility of 
share certificates being issued to persons without notice of 
the contract. The fact that Salt Lake City might have protected 
itself is immaterial. It did not. 
In any event, the defendants expressly pleaded that there 
was no contract between defendants and Salt Lake City. Failure 
to make findings on this point constitutes gross error. The 
only findings that the Court could have made under the evi-
dence in this case would have been that there was no con-
tractural relationship existing between the parties to this action. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING GALLONAGE 
CREDIT ON A MONTHLY BASIS. 
EXhibit H provides that the parties to the contract are 
to receive a credit of 500 gallons per day per acre during the 
winter season and 900 gallons per day per acre during the 
summer. There is no provision in Exhibit H for determination 
pf a period of time in which the credit is to be computed. If 
one of the parties consumes only 200 gallons during one day 
and 1500 gallons on a day in the subsequent month, Exhibit 
H does not specify whether he is to be charged for the full 
·credit on the day in which the .lesser gallonage was used, nor 
does it provide any accounting period or other period for de-
termination of the credit. 
The City, in this action, arbitrarily assessed liability on 
a monthly credit basis. The trial court accepted the City's de-
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.ten;nination.. In this respect ·the ·trial court committed clear 
error. -
\\T e think the court 'vill take notice of the fact that ex-
change agreements are generally made in contemplation of 
the benefits that accrue to the parties. Both Salt Lake City and 
the stockholders who "'·ere parties to the 1920 contract must 
have had in contemplation the relative rights to the use of 
the water not on any particular day or not even any particular. 
week or month. The contract refers to the winter season and 
the summer season. The court n1ight have interpreted the 
contract reasonably as providing for credit based upon these 
seasons. We think the court more correctly would have inter-
preted the contract to provide for accounting on an annual 
basis. In either event, the court clearly erred in computing the 
credit on a monthly basis.· The interpretation of this contract 
is squarely before this court on this question. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in each of the particulars set out 
in this brief. The judgment sho~ld be set aside and instructions 
should be issued to the Trial Court to enter· judgment 
1 
for 
defendants. In any event, the Court should award a new trial 
to defendants and should require the Trial Court to make 
findings upon the isues raised in the defendants' answers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN AND RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
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